Abstract
Introduction
Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is a network of loosely connected (without any central infrastructure) aggregation of mobile computing nodes where messages are transferred from one part of the network to another via multi-hop wireless links. Each mobile node acts as a router, cooperatively constructing routes and forwarding messages for other nodes.
Being inherently decentralized and dynamic, ensuring and enforcing security and normalcy in MANET via run-time monitoring is a challenging task and is the focus of intense research in recent years. Run-time monitoring aims at discovering the abnormalities by comparing the execution against some specific set of normal and/or abnormal behavior. It can be broadly classified into three categories (a) misuse-based (b) anomalybased and (c) specification-based [13] . The misusebased technique relies on pre-specified attack signatures, and any execution sequence matching with a signature is flagged as abnormal. An anomaly-based approach, on the other hand, typically depends on normal patterns, and any deviation from normal is classified as malicious or faulty. A specification-based technique operates in a similar fashion to an anomaly-based method detecting deviations from the specified legitimate system behavior. However, as opposed to anomaly detection, a specification-based approach requires user guidance in developing a model of valid program behavior in a form of specifications. This process, though tedious and reliant on user-expertise, is more accurate than an anomaly-based technique that suffers from a high rate of false positives [13] .
In this context, we propose to develop models of MANET protocols via run-time monitoring. On one hand, the technique is close to anomaly detection which relies on automated learning of run-time patterns. On the other hand, our technique aims to generalize the learnt patterns in a way that incorporates in the models certain degree of abstraction. In this sense, it is close to specification models which are manually synthesized and represent high-level abstract view of the protocol.
Our approach is based on Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) method that induces a hypothesis from individual observations and background knowledge. In our setting we derive an abstract model of protocol behavior from the examples of its executions, where each example represents a sequence of routing messages initiated during a single route discovery. Taking advantage of the commonality of routing traffic, we develop a generalization algorithm for constructing models of routing protocols in automated fashion and present a generated specifications for AODV protocol.
Our model can be effectively employed for: 1. detection of anomalous run-time behavior of the protocol. The execution of the protocol can be monitored against the generated model of valid behavior and any deviation will be flagged as an anomaly. 2. detection of intrusive behavior based on the developed specification model of invalid protocol behavior. 3. validation of the completeness/correctness of existing manually developed specifications. Such specifications may be incomplete due to un-intentional oversight of the specifier and complexity of the protocol. Our generated model can potentially identify these holes in the specifications. 4. analysis of protocol statically via model checking.
Often certain minor oversight in the implementation of the protocol may result in incorrect behavior.
Model checking techniques have the potential to identify such problems if a manageable specification of the implementation is provided. In fact, a typical automated verifier (model checkers, e.g. [4] ) can take as input protocol specifications in the form of a model as synthesized by our technique.
Related Work
As specification-based approach showed to be beneficial in many areas including software testing [2, 3] and intrusion detection [7, 18, 12, 13, 5] , a significant amount of research has been focused in this direction. One of the major downsides of the specification-based approach is the necessity to develop the system specifications manually. As this process is time-consuming and error-prone, automatic generation of specifications is highly beneficial.
As such, Wagner and Dean [18] employed a static analysis to automatically derive program specifications based on control-flow analysis of code, pushdown automaton and 2-gram sequences of system calls derived from control-flow graph. Ko [7] presented a machinelearning approach for developing security specifications automatically based on Inductive Logic Programming method. His work was focused on generating program behavioral specifications at the system call level using an ILP tool, Progol and aimed to reflect security properties of the programs. Although his approach has showed the advantages of automatic development of specifications, it lacked the ability to represent ordering of program operations.
Our work was inspired by this technique. In addition to modeling the ordering of events in program executions, we extend Ko's approach by considering a network setting, specifically, network routing protocols.
While ensuring completeness of the developed specifications is a common difficulty of the specificationbased models, only a few approaches have attempted to address this problem [14] . More recently, several techniques applied specification-based approach to detect attacks against routing protocols, specifically, AODV [16] and OLSR [17, 10] based on the manually developed specifications.
Synthesis of specification models
The central tenet of our technique is that specifications of (MANET) protocols can be synthesized from the flow of the network traffic. A specification, in this context, is a form of a graph where the nodes represent the configuration of the protocol and directed-edges between nodes define how the protocol evolves from one configuration to another. Such a specification model will explicitly include all possible monitored behavior of the protocol that is safe. Furthermore, we generalize the specification with an attempt to include additional behavior of the protocol that is not known to be anomalous. The basis of our specification synthesis (and generalization) is, in principle, similar to inductive logic programming approach presented in the next section.
Inductive Logic Programming
Given a set of examples and background knowledge or facts in the domain of the examples, Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) aims at inducing a hypothesis which when interpreted in the context of background knowledge deduces the examples [8] .
Formally, if B denotes the background knowledge, E denotes the set of examples and H is the generated hypothesis, then ∀e ∈ E : B ∧ H |= e Completeness property (1) The above states that all examples can be deduced (modeled by, |=) from the hypothesis and the background knowledge.
In addition to examples, a set of negative examples may also be provided and the requirement imposed on the hypothesis is that it must not lead to given negative examples. IfĒ be the set of negative examples:
As with completeness, consistency is also defined only with respect to the negative examples inĒ. In the current context, the synthesized specification can be viewed as an hypothesis which will be shown to be both complete and consistent with respect to monitored correct behavior (examples) and known anomalous behavior (negative examples) respectively.
Routing Flows to Specifications
We model the specification of the protocol, under consideration, using the set of request-reply routing flows. A flow is represented by a sequence of routing messages initiated by route request. Each message in a sequence represents a sequence state and includes the information corresponding to the routing message (depending on the routing protocol this information can include source and destination IP addresses, hop count, sequence numbers, etc.). An example of such flow in AODV protocol can be RREQsent → RREPsent → RREPreceived denoting sending of a request, followed by sending of the corresponding reply, followed by receipt of the reply. Formally, a specification model is defined as follows: In the above, S are states of the form RREQsent and T contains transitions of the form RREQsent a → RREPsent where a ∈ A is information corresponding to RREQsent. The specification model can be viewed as a hypothesis that is generated from a set of example sequences E taking into consideration a set of negative example sequencesĒ. The construction procedure ensures the following model property.
The above ensures that all sequences in the example set are also present in the synthesized model (completeness-see Equation 1 ). Furthermore,
The above ensures that the negative examples are not included as any sequence in the synthesized specification model; either the states are not identical or the edgelabels are inconsistent. This follows from the required consistency property of the model (Equation 2). For all states in the sequence Seq k , verticalMerge iteratively checks whether two consecutive states should be merged (Lines [14] [15] . Once the states to be merged are found a new transition that represents a self-loop is created and relationships between corresponding parameters in this transition are set (Lines 16-18 ). The subprocedure setParameters() identifies the relationships (=, <, >, = ) between all parameters associated with two given states. One of the merged states is removed and all its out-going transitions are created as out-going transitions of the other. (Lines 18-22) .
Algorithm for Specification Synthesis
As an example of procedure verticalMerge 1 consider a sequence
States representing forwarding state (RREQfwd and RREPfwd nodes) can be merged together into (generalized) states RREQfwd and RREPfwd with self-loops. The resulting generalized sequence is
To ensure the Consistency property defined in Equation 2 we check whether the resultant generalized sequence from verticalMerge becomes a superstring of any of the negative examples ∈Ē (Line 4). If this is the case, then the generalization is not performed and the original input sequence Seq k is inserted into a specification model M through horizontalMerge procedure which takes as input a sequence Seq k (either in generalized or in original form) and a specification model M .
For each transition in sequence Seq k , horizontalMerge decides whether a new insertion of this transition and corresponding states in M are necessary (Lines 31-33). Each new insertion of the transition is followed by the adjustment of the parameters associated with this transition (Lines 34-35, 43-45). Lines 36-38, 46-50 and 56-58 ensure that none of the negative examples is included into a specification model M . For an example of horizontalMerge, consider two generalized sequences
After performing vertical merge the resulting specification model is
Case Study
We demonstrate the validity of our approach on the example of The Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) and the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) routing protocols. The details on these protocols can be found in [11, 6] .
To construct specifications for these protocols we used traces of valid protocol behavior obtained through ns2 tool [1] . The validity of specifications of routing protocols also depends on the attributes associated with each event in the route request-reply flow (each state in a sequence). To identify the parameters needed to distinguish valid behavior, different feature selection techniques can be applied. In our experiments we used all parameters provided by ns2 simulator. However, final specification model contains only a subset of those features, the rest was removed due to the irrelevancy and space constraints. Figure 2 presents the generated specifications of valid behavior for AODV protocol. Generated AODV specification model contains seven states:
sending RREQ(RREQs), forwarding RREQ(RREQfwd), sending RREP(RREPs), forwarding RREP(RREPfwd), received RREP (RREPrec), sending ERROR(RERRs), Drop. The model starts with a state RREQs indicating the source node sending out a RREQ message. The transition from one state to another occurs only when the corresponding conditions specified in the text box are satisfied. As such when a RREQ reaches an intermediate node and the conditions specified in the text box titled RREQs→ RREQfwd are satisfied, the model enters state RREQfwd; on the other hand, if the conditions specified in the text box titled RREQs→RREPs are satisfied, it enters a state RREQs. From the state RREQs the model has four valid transitions to the states: RREQfwd,RREPrec, RERRs and Drop.
In addition to valid behavior, we have also considered possible attacks against AODV protocol based on the analysis by [9] . The details of the experiments and the misuse specification models for AODV protocol and the results for DSR protocols can be found in [15] .
Conclusion
The constructed models of protocols' behavior describe the protocols' message exchange and the relationships among protocol-relevant attributes as reflected in the network traffic. While properties hidden from the network layer are not represented in these models, they can be incorporated into specifications using experts knowledge on system environment. We feel that approach brings significant benefits to intrusion detection field. Constructed specifications can be used in detecting protocol misuses. However, the approach is not designed as a stand-alone intrusion detection tool, although can be used to complement the existing intrusion detection systems. 
